OctaTouch

Security Threat Model

Assets

  1. Channel archive data — user-created content bound to channels.
  2. Gesture pipeline — must not be exploitable to execute arbitrary code.
  3. Vehicle HMI gate — safety-critical; must not be bypassed.

Threats

Threat Mitigation
Archive id used as path Archive IDs are opaque uint32_t; never interpolated into paths without validation.
Input frame spoofing Platform adapters are the only trusted frame source.
DrivingModeGate bypass DrivingModeGate is stateless and re-evaluated every frame from the CAN bus.
Channel enum out-of-range ChannelLabel() returns "??" for out-of-range values; parsers return nullopt.

Out of Scope

Bluetooth/WiFi channel interception and physical hardware tampering are addressed at the platform layer, not the gesture engine layer.